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SALE OF GOODS IN SERVICE-PREDOMINATED
TRANSACTIONS
The Uniform Commercial Code states that one of its underlying purposes is
"to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions .

. ."I

The need for simplification, clarification and modernization of

commercial law can be seen lucidly from an examination of what, in this comment, shall be termed the sale-service dichotomy. This court-created dichotomy,
simply stated, means that where goods are transferred and paid for as an
incident to a predominately service-oriented transaction, there is only a service,
no sale, and hence no warranty. In other words, where service predominates
there can be no sale. It is hoped that this comment and the logic of two recent
cases will point out the fallacious reasoning that has created this fiction.
The leading case in the area is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.2 In that
case, a patient sued the hospital on warranty theory for contracting serum
hepatitis which resulted from a blood transfusion. The court reasoned that the
purpose of the contract was the care and treatment of the patient and that the
blood supplied was incidental to the service. Therefore the court held that the
essence of the contract was service and the contract was not divisible.3 Since
warranty is a creature of sales law, there was no sale and thus no warranty.
The dissent stated that the action was brought for breach of warranty in the
"sale" of bad blood for -a separate charge and not for the injection of that
blood. 4 The decision in Perinutter has been followed consistently throughout
the country in shielding hospitals3 and blood banks from liability.
The policy behind the Perlmutter decision is just. The need for the blood
is great, the risk is comparatively small, 7 and the possibility of detection of the
1. N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-202(2) (a).
2. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
3. Id. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
4. Id. at 108-09, 123 N.E.2d at 796.
5. See Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Lovett v.
Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves
Latter-Day Saints Hosp., Inc., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961); Gile v.Kennewich
Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956) ; Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center,
Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964). It should be noted that one court has held that
Perlmutter does not deal with express warranties and that parties can contract as they see
fit. However, it seems that the court really discussed an express condition in a contract and
not a "warranty." Napoli v. St. Peter's Hosp., 213 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1961). See also the
dissent in Payton v. Brooklyn Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 898, 252 N.YS.2d 419 (2d Dep't 1964),
aft'd, 19 N.Y.2d 610, 224 N.E.2d 891, 278 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1967).
6. See Whitehurst v. American Natl Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965);
Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d
805 (1965); Krom v. Sharp & Dohme, 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.YS.2d 99 (3d Dep't 1958)c
7. Blood transfusions cause death to approximately one of every 150 persons over age
fifty. 185 J.A..A. 1037 (1963) (editorial). In certain instances as many as one of every
twenty-five patients receiving transfusions is struck by serum hepatitis. Look, March 22, 1966,
at 29. It has even been reported that infection is as high as eight percent of all blood stored
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defect is negligible. Yet the fairness of the decision and the reasoning behind
it is often lost in the process of stare decisis as Perlmutter is cited in commercial
areas for the proposition that if service predominates there is no sale and thus
8
no warranty.
It has been suggested that an analogy should be made between the law of
sales and other areas so that the lack of a sale would not preclude the existence
of a warranty.9 Indeed, a leading New York case, Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v.

Hart,10 has held that there is an implied warranty in a lease. Thus the no-saleno-warranty reasoning has at times been disregarded by the courts, a further
indication of the fallacious reasoning behind the sale-service dichotomy. If

the court is willing to imply a warranty where there is admittedly no sale, then
why not find a warranty where there is a sale although accompanied by a
service? While some courts have implied warranties in non-sales cases," the
majority have not. Thus in order to find a warranty, most courts have had to

find a sale. The supply of water by a city, 12 the leather used in repairing a
shoe,13 an injection of morphine,'14 the installation of a part in a clutch during
its repair,' 5 and the dentures made by a dentist for his patient 0 have all been
held to involve sales. Yet none of these cases was confronted by Perlmutter,
and it would appear that Perlmutteris an obstacle to the extension of consumer

protection through the use of implied warranties. In order to extend protection
to a transaction which has both sale and service aspects, the sale aspect must
for transfusions. 49 Chi. Bar Rec. 22 (1967). Yet as alarming as these figures may be, the
amount of harm caused by infected blood in comparison to the benefits conferred by pure
blood seems insufficient to call for the doctrine of strict liability in tort. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A, comment k, at 353 (1965); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50
Minn, L. Rev. 791, 811-12 (1966). See generally Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 640 (1958).
8. See, e.g., William H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally & Co., 195 F. Supp. 621, 626
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Aegis Prods., Inc. v. Arriflex Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d
185 (4th Dep't 1966); Ben Constr. Corp. v. Ventre, 23 App. Div. 2d 44, 257 N.Y.S.2d
988 (4th Dep't 1965) (construction of a swimming pool not a sale, thus no warranty).
9. See, e.g., 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 28.19, at 1576 (1956); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 653 (1957);
Comment, Implied Warranties in Service Contracts, 39 Notre Dame Law. 680 (1964).
10. 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342 (1923). See also Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 45 NJ. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). It has been suggested that an analogy can be made
between a bailor and the hospital or blood bank since both supply the goods. 2 L. Frumer
& M. Friedman, Products Liability § 19.02(2), at 502 (1967).
11. Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342 (1923); Dodd v. Wilson,
[1946] 2 All E.R. 691 (K.B.); Samuels v. Davis, [1943] 2 All E.R. 3 (C.A.). See generally
Farnsworth, supra note 9.
12. Canavan v. Mechanicville, 229 N.Y. 473, 128 N.E. 882 (1920).
13. Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526 (1935).
14. Ratigan v. United States, 88 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1937) (criminal).
15. Delo Auto Supply, Inc., v. Tobin, 198 Misc. 601, 100 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Syracuse Mun.
Ct. 1950).
16. Lee v. Griffin, 121 Eng. Rep. 716 (Ex. 1861).
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be isolated and warranties implied. However, in order to do this, the Perlinutter
reasoning must be disregarded or held to be antiquated.
While the courts are often justifiably slow to disregard stare decisis, it would
seem that a good argument can be advanced for the proposition that the
Uniform Commercial Code has overruled Perlmutter.Article 2 of the Code deals
with "transactions in goods." 17 While the word "transactions" is nowhere
defined in the Code, "goods" is defined as "all things... which are movable at
the time of ... the contract for sale ....18 A seller is one "who sells or contracts to sell goods."' 9 A buyer is one "who buys or contracts to buy goods.'*0
"A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price . ... ,21 Under these definitions, there would seem to be a sale in
Perlmutter, as the Code contains no requirement that the sale not be accompanied by a service. To hold that there is no sale where there is also service
involved seems inconsistent. If a person were to walk into a medical supplier
and purchase blood, there would obviously be a sale. The warranties that
accompany the product should be no different when the hospital buys it from
a supplier.
In Russel v. Community Blood Bank, hc., 2 2- a Florida court held that the
supplying of blood by a blood bank is a sale and as such, implied warranties
are present. The court stated:
It is evident . .. that although many of the decisions denying recovery for breach
of implied warranty are based on the technical distinction between a service and a
sale, the factor underlying the decisions is the inability, in the present state of medical knowledge, to detect or remove the virus which causes serum hepatitis. It is
often stated that it would be against public policy to impose strict warranty ....
The Perlmutter court was concerned with the supplier becoming ...an insurer of
a patient should anything happen as a result of "bad" blood. If the transaction were looked upon as a sale, there would indeed be warranty
liability, subject to a valid disclaimer. Warranty liability is not predicated
upon fault, and lack of knowledge of the defect or how to detect it is irrelevant.L2 4 "If it were deemed that the protection of the sick person, the patient
who received blood, was more important than protecting the hospital, then...
sufficient logic and reason could have been used to impose the liability... simply
by holding that the providing of the blood constituted a sale." 2 5
17. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-102.
18. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-105.
19. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (d).
20. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (a).
21. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-106(1). It should also be noted that § 2-204 allows a contract to
be made by conduct.
22. 185 So. 2d 749 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966), aff'd, 196 So. 2d 115 (1967).
23. Id. at 752 (citations ommitted).
24. See Foley v. Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 468, 241 N.YS. 233 (Sup. Ct.
1930), aff'd mem., 232 App. Div. 822, 249 N.Y.S. 924 (2d Dep't 1931). See also 2 L. Frumer
& M. Friedman, supra note 10, § 19.01(3), at 483 (1967).
25. R. Duesenberg & L. King, Sales & Bulk Transfers Under the Uniform Commercial
Code § 7.01(2) (i), at 7-7 (1966).
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Once there is a sale, the next question to ask is whether there is a warranty.
If the supplier had sold to the hospital blood which it did not own, there
seems little likelihood that the court would not say there is a breach of the
warranty of title.2 6 However, problems arise when the court deals with an
implied warranty of merchantability. 27 First, the seller must be a "merchant
with respect to goods of that kind. ' 28 Merchant is defined as "a person who deals
in goods of the kind or . . .holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved .
*...
-2 Second, there must have
been no effective disclaimer of the warranty. The implied warranty of merchantability can be excluded by language which mentions merchantability
which if written must be conspicuous; 30 by "language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that there is no implied warranty;" 31 or, by course of dealing, course of
performance or by usage of the trade.3 2 The supplier of blood or medical
supplies is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, and consequently,
unless the implied warranty is excluded it will be implied in the contract of
sale with the hospital.
Assuming therefore that the warranty is not excluded, the blood would have
to be fit for the ordinary purpose for which it is used.33 If the blood contained
serum hepatitis, it would not be so fit, and there would be a breach of the
warranty from the supplier to the hospital. Once there is a warranty to the
hospital, in view of the decline of privity requirements as evidenced by the
decision in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corporation,34 it would appear
that the injured patient should be able to take advantage of that warranty.
In Goldberg, the deceased was killed in a commercial air crash. An action
was brought against the manufacturer of the airplane for breach of an implied
warranty. The plaintiff recovered even though there was only a service contract between the plaintiff and his contracting party, the airline. Thus by
analogy, it would seem that even if the court finds a service contract between
the patient and the hospital, there is still a sale from the supplier to the hospital
and the plaintiff should have the benefit of any warranty that exists in that
sale.8 5
While Goldberg was not decided under the Code, there is no reason to believe
26. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-312.
27. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314.
28.

N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(1).

29. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
30. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316. A term is "conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it." N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-201 (10).

31. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
32. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c).
N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
34. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). See also Sevits v. McKlernan33.

Terry Corp., 264 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co.,
50 Misc. 2d 547, 270 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 29 App. Dlv.
2d 781, 287 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Ist Dep't 1968).
35. See Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
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that the Code has altered the importance of the decision. Section 2-318 states
that "[a] seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty."3 6 The official comment indicates that beyond that which is provided "the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given
to his buyer who
37
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain."
Once a sale from the supplier to the hospital has been shown, the plaintiff
might also want to join the hospital in the action. The only difference between
the two actions is that service predominates in the contract between the patient
and the hospital. It should be noted that, in a logically parallel situation, where
food is served for value, there is a sale between the restaurant and its patron
under the implied warranty section of the Code.38 In some states prior to the
Code this was viewed as a service and not a sale, 30 which view prompted a
New Jersey court in a recent case to state:
The rule that food served in a restaurant was not impliedly Varranted to be fit for
human consumption although food sold in a store was so warranted, had no support
in modem concepts of justice. It was an anachronism. It is unthinkable that such a
legalism should be revived to avoid holding hospitals and blood banks liable. If these
valuable organizations are to be exempted from liability, the immunity should be
based upon the true policy consideration and not upon an irrelevant circumstance. 40
While the New York Annotation to the implied warranty section notes that the
addition of the restaurant-served food to transactions deemed sales does not
change Perlmutter,41 the Annotation is subject to question. The Code was
adopted throughout states which had previously followed a sale-service dichotomy as to food purchases. When the restaurant food rule was changed, the
sale-service dichotomy as to food was obviated. As one commentator has
stated, "[t] he real question, as the new Act recognizes, is not 'sale' or 'no sale,'
but rather what the good faith restaurant keeper [hospital] ...

undertakes tc

deliver: clearly, food [blood] fit for consumption.1 42 Under the implied warranty section of the Code, all that is required is "the serving for value of food
or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere .... ,,43
If a hospital visitor were served food in the hospital cafeteria a warranty
would be implied. This warranty should apply also when the patient is served
food in his room. A contrary holding would clearly be in derogation of the Code.
36.

N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318.

37. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 3.
38. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(1).
39. See, e.g., Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 A. 805 (CL Err. & App. 1927).

40. Jackson v. Mfuhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 323, 232 A.2d 879, 884 (1967).
41. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314, New York Annot. (1) (b).
42. Note, Warranties of Kind and Quality Under the Uniform Revised Sales Act, 57 Yale
L.J. 1389, 1398-99 (1948).
43. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(1).
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It should be of no importance that the Code specifically mentions food and
does not mention blood. Inclusio unius est exlusio alterius has no application to
the Code; section 1-102 indicates that the Code should be liberally construed
and applied in order to promote its underlying purposes. For example, the Code
has no difficulty avoiding the sale-service dichotomy in the case of a contract
involving both the labor and the raw materials for a specially manufactured
good. Instead of deeming such a contract to be predominated by a sale or a
service, the Code provides that the contract is governed by all of Article 2,
except the statute of frauds section. 44 Hence the resultant good is subject to
all Code warranties. Similarly, if A custom tailors a coat for B, surely the cost
of the services predominates
and yet there would seem to be little question that
45
the coat is warranted.

The argument was made in Perlmutter that the food and the coat cases are
distinguishable from the hospital case because in the former cases the purchaser is interested in the food or the coat and not the service, while in the
latter case the person is interested not specifically in the blood but in regaining
his health.48 This seems another mere technical fiction. If one were interested
simply in a coat why would we have it custom tailored? The purchaser is as
interested in the tailor as he is in the cloth. In any event, the end result of the
coat is not the coat itself but what it does to the purchaser's body temperature
or ego. The same argument is made with the food. If one wanted food and
nothing else, why go to a restaurant? The gentleman wants the coat for his
purpose, the diner wants food for his purpose and the patient wants blood for
his purpose. No purchase is an end in itself but each is a means to an ultimate
end the purchaser wants to attain. It seems merely a question of the directness
in which the purchase of the good accomplishes the purpose of its purchaser.
There is a sale from the hospital to the patient as well as from the supplier
to the hospital, and if there is no successful disclaimer there should be an
implied warranty of merchantability. "There is no logical reason why a merchant should be held to fair product standards, i.e., warranties, while a doctor
or dentist is not. Indeed, one would expect things to be just the reverse. ' 47
It is probable that if the courts were to hold the hospitals or suppliers liable, the
legislatures would respond by absolving them of liability as has been done in
some states.4° In the meantime, the courts will have freed the consumer from
precedents which become onerous when they are, inevitably, carried over into
other service predominated areas.
Indeed, simply by holding that there is a sale, the courts would not necessarily
place liability on the hospitals. If the policy considerations are deemed imN.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (a).
45. See notes 17-19, supra and cases cited therein.
44.
46.

308 N.Y. at 107, 123 N.E.2d at 796.

47. 1 Uniform Commercial Code Law Letter 3, col. 1 (No. 4, June 1967).
48. This has been done in, e.g., Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1151 (Supp. 1967)
(no sale); in California, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1623 (1900) (no sale); and in Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1967).
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portant by the courts, they could reason that the implied warranty is automatically excluded in blood cases by trade usage49 since those in the trade are
aware of the possibilities of the hepatitis. In addition, agency principles could
be applied to absolve the hospital and the supplier. r0i If the doctor is viewed
as the agent of the patient, then his knowledge of the possibility of serum
hepatitis would be imputed to the patient,5 1 and the contract description of the
goods would include infected blood. The bad blood would then "pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description,"52 as is required by the
Code,53 and the implied warranty would not have been breached.
The question remains, then, what will this reasoning do to the law of warranty? If Perlmutter has been overruled by the Code, then it can no longer
be authority for those cases where, in the past, predominance of service has
prevented the use of implied warranties. Thus when a person contracts to have
a swimming pool built and installed, the materials used will be warranted."
With the advance of consumer protection laws this seems just. In addition, in
New York, the person who performs a service pays a tax on the income received
for his services. 55 It is not unusual that this tax is shifted to the consumer. If the
consumer is to pay the tax, why not give him the basic protection of warranties
where materials are furnished?
This reasoning has been followed in two recent cases where trial courts in
New York and New Jersey held that there is a sale under Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code where goods were transferred in a service predominated transaction. In the New Jersey case, Jackson v. Mulenberg
Hospital,56 an action was brought by a patient against a hospital and a blood
bank on the ground that the plaintiff had contracted serum hepatitis as a result
of a blood transfusion. The plaintiff claimed in negligence, strict liability and
breach of warranties. The court dismissed the claim of strict liability but found
a cause of action on the other two theories. Though the action for breach of
the implied warranty was also dismissed because there was a successful disclaimer, the court boldly stated that "[t]he transfer of human blood for a
consideration is a sale. So is its transfusion into the body of a patient when a
charge is made for the blood."ST In the New York case, Cheshire v. South49. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c). N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) provides: "A usage of trade is
any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation
or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction
in question."
50. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 NJ. Super. 314, 330, 232 A2d 879, 888 (1967).
51. See 200 E. End Ave. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 415, 172 N.Y.S2d
409, (1st Dep't 1958), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 731, 158 N.E.2d 508, 185 N.YS.2d 216 (1959).
52. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (a).
53. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314.
54. See note 11, supra and cases cited therein.
55. N.Y. Tax Law §§ 1101(5), 1105(c) (3).
56. 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967).
57. Id. at 324, 232 A.2d at 884.
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hampton Hospital Association,5" the plaintiff had been a patient at the defendant
hospital and the hospital had supplied the surgeon with a surgical pin manufactured by the defendant manufacturing company. The pin was defective and
caused injuries for which the plaintiff brought an action on a breach of implied
warranty theory. The court, after discussing authorities, held that the plaintiff
should be allowed to prove a sale of the pin.59
It is hoped that the reason of these two cases will prevail. If a warranty is
present when the good is sold separately, then a warranty should be present
when the good accompanies a service. The proposition that there is no sale
when goods pass from one person to another in the context of a service predominated contract is a legal fiction which merely serves to deprive the
consumer of needed protection.
58.
59.

53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
In a recent New Jersey case, Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 37 U.S.L.W. 2130 (N.J.

Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1968), the court held that implied warranties attached to the application
of a product to plaintiff's scalp in defendant's beauty parlor. The court hedged, however.
It said that the warranty should apply even though this was not a typical sale. The holding
seemed to extend warranty protection to the supplying of a product where the court was
unwilling to deem the supplying a sale. See Farnsworth, supra note 9.

